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Democratization or Business As Usual?  
Evaluating Long Term Impact of Africa’s 
Watershed Elections 
 
 
Anna Brigevich  
North Carolina Central University 
 
Abstract: In many African countries, “watershed” elections led to 
political liberalization, and to democratization in a handful of cases. 
However, years later, many liberalized regimes backslid into 
authoritarianism. This paper evaluates the long-term impact of 
these election outcomes. Using a transitology framework, it shows 
that the reforms implemented at this crucial time dictated the course 
of liberalization well into the 2010s. Countries where a cohesive 
opposition managed to wrestle power from the elites have retained 
their liberalization gains to date. Countries where the opposition 
was more disorganized and where civil society was weaker remain, 
at best, hybrid regimes. 
 
Keywords: African democratization, transitology, opposition 
cohesion, regime trajectories 
 
The early 1990s witnessed tremendous political and economic 
changes throughout the world. The collapse of the Soviet Union 
discredited the viability of authoritarian regimes in Central and 
Eastern Europe, Latin America, parts of Asia, and Sub-Saharan 
Africa (SSA). This phenomena, to which I refer as the “fourth wave 
of democratization,”1 swept away many authoritarian regimes and 
one-party states, and, in a number of cases, replaced them with 
governments determined to enact pro-democratic, liberal reforms. In 
South Africa, Benin, Ghana, and Senegal the transition period 
                                               
1 I borrow the term “fourth wave of democratization” from McFaul (2002), who uses it to 
describe regime change in the post-communist space. Typically, it has been the scholarly 
practice to refer to any transitions post-1970 as the “third wave of democratization” 
(Huntington 1991). However, I find McFaul’s term more useful for this analysis, as it 
focuses on the post-1989 transition period in particular, and excludes countries that 
attempted democratization prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
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resulted in genuine democratization. However, the initial euphoria 
surrounding the relatively small number of genuine democratic 
transitions in the fourth wave quickly dissipated, as democratization 
scholars discovered that regime transitions were rarely synonymous 
with democratic consolidation (Wahman 2014). In many African 
cases, such as Kenya, Mozambique, Nigeria, and Zambia, apparent 
political reform has been minimal, and often confined solely to the 
holding of multiparty elections, many of which have been fraudulent 
(Lindberg 2006). Furthermore, some African regimes, such as 
Angola and Cameroon have not transitioned from authoritarian rule, 
relying on severe repression to forestall political liberalization. 
 Successful democratization has proven to be only one of the 
possible regime outcomes in the fourth wave. Authoritarian regimes 
still exist, although they are less common now than before the 
collapse of the Soviet Union (Diamond 2002). However, more 
prevalent than democracies and autocracies are “hybrid regimes” 
that exhibit elements of both authoritarianism and democracy. In 
these countries, multiparty elections may be held regularly, but 
government elites consistently manipulate these elections to make 
sure that the opposition has little chance of winning (Schedler 2006; 
Howard and Roessler 2006).2 As the fourth wave of democratization 
draws to a close, scholars recognize that democratic consolidation is 
not the global norm. In fact, some argue that we are witnessing 
worrying democratic backsliding, particularly in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, as democratic gains have stalled out, if not reversed, post-
2006 (Gyimah-Boadi 2015; Diamond 2015). If that is the case, then 
the watershed election period is all the more crucial to our 
understanding why some countries got the transition “right,” while 
others got it “wrong.”   
 This paper focuses on explaining regime variation in the 
fourth wave in Sub-Saharan Africa. As such, it is concerned with 
two puzzles. First, what leads to successful democratization: why 
have some countries managed transitions to democracy, while others 
have slipped back into authoritarianism? Second, what gives rise to 
and accounts for the persistence of hybrid regimes in the fourth 
wave?  
                                               
2 Throughout the past decade, scholars have coined a variety of labels to describe these 
hybrid regimes, such as “electoral authoritarianism” (Schedler 2002), “competitive 
authoritarianism” (Levitsky and Way 2002), “gray zone” countries (Carothers 2002), and 
“semi-authoritarianism” (Ottaway 2003). 
2
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 I take the fourth wave founding elections,3 also referred to as 
Africa’s “watershed” elections, as the starting point of inquiry and 
argue that the outcomes of these elections conditioned the success or 
failure of democratization decades later. Furthermore, I assert that 
the outcome of these founding elections was highly determined by 
the nature of three key groups involved in the transition process---
the old authoritarian elites, opposition movements, and civil society. 
In this paper, I develop an agency-centered theoretical framework 
that tests the effects of these three groups of actors on the degree of 
democratization achieved since the initial transition period. My 
findings reveal that opposition cohesion and civil society strength 
increase the chances for liberalization and democratization in the 
fourth wave. I conclude with a brief discussion of what can be done 
to improve the quality of democracy in present-day hybrid and 
authoritarian regimes. 
 
Theorizing Democratization Post-1989 
Democratization theory has evolved significantly since the 1960s, 
reflecting both our increased understanding of the process of 
democratization, as well as the incorporation of newer democratic 
regimes into the theoretical framework. Initially, democratization 
scholars (Lipset 1959; Moore 1966) argued that long-standing 
structural factors were the best predictors for the success or failure 
of democracy, and historical legacies were seen as the driving force 
behind regime change. Furthermore, regime transition was 
conceptualized in terms of change towards greater democracy. 
These theories worked relatively well in explaining the centuries-
long process of democratization in Western Europe, where 
democracy developed in concert with capitalism and populations 
were relatively homogeneous. However, as many scholars of fourth 
wave transitions came to realize, traditional democratization theories 
offered little insight into the complex processes unfolding in the 
modern world.  
 Traditional theories could not account for the appearance of 
democratic movements in places where the required structural 
factors were largely absent. For example, the legacies argument 
                                               
3 A distinction must be made here between founding elections in general, and the 
founding elections in the fourth wave. In Africa, most countries held founding elections 
in the 1960s, following the withdrawal of colonial powers. However, with the exception 
of Botswana, these elections resulted in the institutionalization of an authoritarian regime, 
military rule, or a one-party state. Hence, no more genuinely democratic, multiparty 
elections were held until 1990, when a fresh wave of multiparty elections began anew. In 
this paper, I focus only on these post-1989 elections. 
3
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cannot explain why economically underdeveloped and resource-
poor Benin developed democratic institutions following its first 
multiparty elections in 1991, and why the country is currently one of 
the strongest democracies in the region (Stroh 2018), while Togo 
and Chad, which share a similar economic and social structure to 
Benin, remain authoritarian (Hanson 2015). It became increasingly 
apparent that transitioning countries were not simply moving 
towards forms of consolidated democracy, but exhibited a wide 
range of regime outcomes. As a result, scholars of the fourth wave 
of democratization began searching for an alternative theory, one 
that reflected the changes taking place during the transition period. 
These scholars began analyzing the transition period itself and the 
decisions taken at the individual level by the elites, the opposition, 
and societal actors (Bratton and van de Walle 1992; Easter 1997; 
Fish 1999; Jones-Luong 2000; van de Walle 2002; McFaul 2002; 
Hale 2005). 
 One of the crucial steps towards constructing an agency-based 
theory to democratic transitions in the fourth wave has been the 
application of the transitology paradigm, initially laid out in 
O’Donnell and Schmitter’s 1986 seminal book Transitions from 
Authoritarian Rule. Largely informed by third wave transitions in 
Latin America during the 1970s and 1980s, O’Donnell and 
Schmitter analyze the interactions between the old elites and 
opposition groups. They argue that there is no transition whose 
beginning is not the consequence of important divisions within the 
authoritarian regime itself between the hard-liners and the soft-
liners. Once these divisions become apparent, soft-liners have the 
incentive to either defect from the old regime or to initiate pacting, 
which they define as talks with the opposition movements on 
liberalizing the political system. As the soft-liners lower the cost for 
engaging in collective action, they quickly discover that former 
political identities reemerge and new ones expand beyond the public 
spaces the rulers were willing to tolerate at the beginning of the 
transition, (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986: 48-49). Emboldened by 
the thawing-out of the political system, opposition groups will press 
for multiparty elections. If the split between the elites is severe, it 
will undermine their organizational capacity, lower extent of their 
ability to manipulate election results, and, ultimately, harm their 
chances of winning the election.  
 The handful of successful democratic transitions of the early 
1990s reinforced the notion among US policymakers and aid 
practitioners that countries undergoing political changes were 
moving towards democracy. However political scientists engaged in 
4
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the study of democracy noticed that the reality was much murkier. 
As Thomas Carothers (2002) points out, many of the countries that 
were labeled as transitioning to democracy, such as the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, were in fact stalled democratic experiments 
or were undergoing a reversion to authoritarianism. As such, these 
countries were not transitioning at all, but were developing their 
own distinct form of governance that mixed authoritarianism with 
some elements of democracy.  
 Given the prevalence of hybrid regimes, it is not surprising 
that democracy scholars currently focus primarily on this group of 
countries. Although I agree with Howard and Roessler (2006) that 
there is a need to study these regimes in relation to one another, 
rather than highlighting the numerous ways in which they fall short 
of the standard set by advanced democracies, focusing solely on 
hybrid regimes obfuscates the larger transition patterns in the region. 
The only way to address this is to develop a comprehensive 
theoretical framework for regime change that encompasses all of the 
fourth wave regime types. In a sense, we must resurrect the 
transitology paradigm, while updating it to reflect the prevalence 
and persistence of hybrid regimes. 
 
The Transitology Paradigm in the African Context 
Initiating Liberalization 
The demise of the USSR serves as a critical juncture in this analysis. 
The Soviet collapse triggered liberalization in SSA countries in a 
number of ways. First, the mass protests in Eastern Europe set off 
similar popular protests in SSA (Bratton and van de Walle 1992) 
and emboldened opposition movements to push for democratic 
reforms in Africa (El-Khawas 2001). Unable to contain public 
outcries against the oppressiveness and corruption of the existing 
regimes, authoritarian elites were faced with one of three actions, 
(see Cheeseman 2015). First, institute genuine liberalizing reforms 
and acquiesce to future elections, in the hopes that the dictator can 
turn democratizer, and retain his office while maintaining a sense of 
wide-spread legitimacy. Arguably, this transpired in 1993 Malawi, 
where President-for-Life Hastings Banda held a referendum on 
reinstituting multi-party democracy, which passed with 64% of the 
vote, and ended the Malawi Congress Party’s 37-year monopoly on 
power. General elections the next year saw Banda defeated and 
ousted from office. This course of action was rare, as the 
authoritarian elites were simply hoping to ride out the maelstrom of 
the first multiparty elections.  
5
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 Second, the elites could opt for cosmetic reforms, enough to 
appease the protesters in the immediate-term, but to forestall any 
further liberalization in the future. This was the most common of the 
options taken by the elites. Case and point the actions of Benin’s 
President Mathieu Kérékou, who held a national conference to 
rebuild state authority in 1989, drawing together all sectors of 
Beninese society, but with no actual intent of democratizing (Brown 
and Kaiser 2007). This type of liberalization was, in many cases, 
sufficient to pry the regime open further than the elites originally 
intended, as was indeed the case in Benin, where Nicéphore Soglo, a 
technocrat in Kérékou’s government, declared conference 
sovereignty, established the mechanisms for a transition to a 
constitutional democratic regime, and ousted Kérékou. O’Donnell 
and Schmitter (1986: 7) point out that if the initial liberalized 
practices are not viewed as obviously threatening to the regime 
(particularly if the elites perceive their chances of winning the first 
elections as relatively high), then they tend to accumulate, become 
institutionalized, and raise the perceived costs of eventual 
annulment. This then paves the way for future democratization.  
 The third option for elites was to reject the process of 
liberalization, either by instituting minor reforms and planning to 
outright manipulate the elections or failing to hold elections 
altogether (Swaziland, Democratic Republic of the Congo). In some 
cases (Angola, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Burundi) elections 
were only viable options after the conclusion of prolonged civil 
conflict. 
 Given this array of actions, the chances of democratization 
are clearly more likely in the first scenario. However, the second 
scenario also has potential for greater political change, and is 
determined by the uncertain dynamic of actors’ intentions and 
actions during the transition period (Wahman 2014). The third 
option leaves no room for democratization, and frequently leads to 
violent regime overthrows.  
 Mass protests are only part of the story. The other motivating 
factor conditioning regime change was the de-legitimization of 
authoritarianism broadly, both in domestic and international politics. 
As Frederick Chiluba in Zambia famously said, if the very architects 
of communism cast aside the one-party regime, then who are 
Africans to continue to support it (quoted in Bratton and van de 
Walle 1992: 425). As authoritarianism came under greater scrutiny 
in the international realm, wealthy donors, such as the US, the IMF, 
and the World Bank, began demanding political reform by explicitly 
mandating multiparty elections. As a result, African dictators were 
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forced to initiate multiparty elections, whether genuine or highly 
manipulated, as a sign of accepting the new, more democratic rules 
of the game (Cheeseman 2015: 93). By May 1991, at least twenty-
one African governments adopted significant political reforms to 
permit greater pluralism and competition, and by 1995, thirty-five 
out of the forty-eight sub-Saharan African countries had held multi-
party elections, (see Bienen and Herbst 1996; Bratton and van de 
Walle 1992; El-Khawas 2001).  
 
The Watershed Elections as a Critical Juncture 
For many African countries, the regime type that emerged following 
the first multiparty elections has persisted well into the recent years. 
In other words, these elections set the precedent for the manner in 
which the democratization process was to be carried out. As van de 
Walle (2002: 71) points out, “Countries where incumbents went 
down in the transition maelstrom are significantly more democratic 
today than countries where the dictator rode out the coming of 
multiparty politics.” The first elections set patterns that persisted 
throughout the decade, and were predicated on whether the 
opposition managed to establish themselves during these elections 
(van de Walle 2002; Bratton and van de Walle 1992; Lindberg 2004 
and 2006). Hence, in Mali, Benin, and Cape Verde, incumbent 
turnover resulted in the establishment of a stable democratic regime, 
while in Angola, Djibouti, and Equatorial Guinea the ability of the 
incumbent to retain control has resulted in a constriction of the 
political space.    
 The transitology paradigm offers a fruitful theoretical 
framework for analyzing and comparing regime change. In this 
framework, the founding elections are a critical juncture in a 
country’s transition process; they are an important signal of an 
official break with the authoritarian past and a significant departure 
from the arbitrariness of authoritarian rule (O’Donnell 2002). At the 
same time, founding elections are moments of high uncertainty, and 
their results cannot be predicted from the existing political and 
social structures (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986: 61; Schmitter and 
Karl 1994: 4-5). During the transition, existing political institutions 
become temporarily suspended, and actors are forced to make 
hurried and confused choices. Those in power may seriously 
overestimate the support for the old regime, while those outside it 
may underestimate their capacity to draw votes from the masses 
(O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986: 61). The outcome of these hurried 
decisions is often not what any one group would have initially 
preferred (Schmitter and Karl 1994; Fish 1999). In this highly 
7
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uncertain context, the only way to understand regime outcomes is to 
examine the roles that key actors play during the transition period 
(Fish 1999).  
 
Updating the Transitology Paradigm 
There is a critical difference between the findings of O’Donnell and 
Schmitter and those of fourth wave scholars. In O’Donnell and 
Schmitter’s argument, the drive towards democratization originates, 
at least initially, from within the old regime. Yet Africanist scholars 
agree that the old elites play a much more limited role in bringing 
about political liberalization, and typically have a negative effect on 
the prospects for democratization (van de Walle 2002; Bienen and 
Herbst 1996; Joseph 1997). However, at the core of both these 
arguments lies the idea that elite splits facilitate regime change by 
making elites less capable of fending off demands for political 
liberalization. As such, I do not view these arguments as necessarily 
incompatible. Rather, in the newer democratization theory, the 
burden of initiating regime change falls on other actors, (see 
Cheeseman 2015).    
 If the old elites were always resistant to political 
liberalization, then what accounts for the regime changes that 
transpired throughout SSA? Democratization scholars agree that the 
single most important factor leading to political liberalization and 
successful democratization in the fourth wave was opposition 
victory during the founding elections (Bunce 1999; Fish 1998; van 
de Walle 2002; Bratton and van de Walle 1992; Easter 1997). 
Victory for the opposition served to reinforce the break with the 
authoritarian past, and ushered in the potential for democratic 
reform. This is not to say that opposition victory immediately 
translated into democratic reform.  In fact, more recent work by 
Wahman (2014) shows that electoral turnover does not necessarily 
produce democracy; both opposition victory and incumbent re-
election have the potential to improve democratic governance. 
According to Wahman, the key factor to consider is the degree of 
electoral uncertainty in subsequent elections – if the degree of 
uncertainty is high, then both incumbent elites and a recently elected 
opposition-turned-government are more likely to erode democratic 
norms in the hopes of recapturing office. However, as the historical 
institutionalism literature argues (Capoccia and Keleman 2007), 
once initial choices are made (i.e., the decision to democratize), they 
close off alternative options (i.e., the reconsolidation of power) and 
lead to the establishment of institutions that generate self-
reinforcing, path-dependent process (i.e., free and fair elections, 
8
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electoral oversight, the independence of the judiciary, etc.).  For 
example, in Niger, victory for the opposition movement Alliance of 
Forces for Change (AFC), comprised of six different parties, 
translated into little more than intra-group squabbling in the 
legislature, and the consequent break-down of the political system 
altogether, (see Gervais 2018). It was only when the old ruling 
party, the National Movement for a Society of Development 
(MNSD), won the subsequent elections that genuine democratic 
reform could proceed anew. However, the case of Niger 
demonstrates that once regime change is initiated the chances for 
political liberalization increase dramatically. 
 Turning to the merits of electoral turnover in the watershed 
elections, opposition victory signals to the masses that regime 
change is possible, and the masses will be more likely to hold the 
opposition to its promise of democratic reform (Bunce 1999; Teorell 
and Wahman 2018). Second, the old elite will be presented with two 
options: disband, and permanently relinquish all hold on political 
power, or reform, and adhere to the democratic rules of the new 
game (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Bunce 1999). Albeit, in 
reality, a group of the old elites may nullify election results and 
hijack the government, typically in the form of a military coup, or 
may suspend any further liberalization. In Niger, President Ousmane 
refused to appoint a member of the opposition as prime minister 
after his own coalition collapsed. In Nigeria, the military annulled 
the election of Chief Abiola as president, and suspended civilian 
rule (Bienen and Herbst 1996). These examples highlight the 
tentative nature of the transition process.  
 Opposition victory is highly dependent on the ability of 
different opposition groups to ban together during election time, or 
opposition cohesion (Bratton and van de Walle 1992; Howard and 
Roessler 2006; Olukoshi 1999; Bratton and van de Walle 1997; van 
de Walle 2002). During the transition process, opposition groups 
face serious power asymmetries vis-à-vis the old elites, and 
opposition parties face an uphill battle in persuading voters to 
choose them over the incumbent (Howard and Roessler 2006: 371). 
Most of the resources used to fund electoral campaigns are 
concentrated in the hands of the old elite, while opposition parties 
rely on a handful of patrons, usually their leaders, to finance their 
activities. Writing about the general weakness of African opposition 
parties, Olukoshi (1999: 29) notes that as part of the strategy 
employed by incumbent regimes to weaken the opposition, public 
sector patronage was withdrawn from private sector business 
organizations that were sympathetic to or identified with the 
9
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opposition. As a result, opposition parties lack the sufficient 
resources to build a nationwide political party that has the capacity 
to effectively challenge the incumbent. This problem is further 
exacerbated in ethnically diverse states, where regional opposition 
parties run on platforms that appeal to only their own ethnic groups 
(Elischer 2013). Information asymmetries prevail as the government 
still has unequivocal control of the media and thus the capacity to 
discredit the opposition in the public eye 
 As a result, it is crucial that opposition groups present a 
united front during election time. A cohesive opposition increases 
the prospects for democratization in several ways. First, it takes 
votes away from the ruling regime and introduces the possibility of 
a democratic regime turnover (Bunce 1999; Fish 1999). Second, it 
prevents the incumbent regime from utilizing a divide-and conquer-
strategy, in which the government manipulates, co-opts, and 
represses less powerful opposition parties (van de Walle 2002; van 
Eerd 2017). Third, the government will be less likely to engage in 
electoral manipulation for fear of public backlash from the 
opposition supporters (Howard and Roessler 2006). These factors all 
contribute to the institutionalization of democratic practices in a 
previously closed political regime. Furthermore, opposition 
candidates, once in power, will be more likely to keep their 
campaign promises and to stick to the democratic rules of the game 
because they realize that the same electorate that voted them into 
office may just as easily vote them out (Bunce 1999).  
 Some authors argue that a vibrant civil society is necessary to 
secure opposition victory (Bunce 1999; Bratton and van de Walle 
1992; Fish 1999). A vibrant civil society pressures the authoritarian 
government for reform, and actively supports opposition candidates 
during election time. Furthermore, by actively protesting against the 
government, civic groups may encourage old elites to defect to the 
opposition, lowering elite capacity to maintain control of the state 
(O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Bratton and van de Walle 1992). 
On the other hand, if civil society is weak, typically due to the 
oppressive nature of the old regime, it will be less vocal about the 
need for reform, and will support the authoritarian incumbent for 
fear of government backlash. However, as of yet, the role civil 
society plays in driving the fourth wave democratization process is 
highly undertheorized and is absent from many explanations of 
regime change, (for an exception, see Lewis 2018). This is due, in 
part, to the belief that civil society in SSA is generally weak and 
plays an insignificant role in the transition process (Randall and 
10
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Svasand 2002; Bienen and Herbst 1996; van de Walle 2002; El-
Khawas 2001).   
 There is an important distinction in the function of these two 
groups of actors. Opposition movements and political parties 
attempt to affect regime change through contesting elections and 
holding political office. Civic groups, on the other hand, are not 
involved in the government directly, but attempt to affect change 
through casting a vote for specific candidates and holding the 
political leadership accountable for their policies. Thus, it is possible 
to have opposition and civic groups that vary in strength and 
effectiveness in the same political system, and these variations 
contribute to the different regime outcomes that characterize the 
fourth wave.  
 
Explaining Hybrid Regimes 
What accounts for the presence of hybrid regimes? Hybrid regimes 
emerge in situations where the opposition is fragmented but elite 
capacity is too low to fully exclude the opposition from participating 
in the new government or to fully consolidate authoritarian rule. 
Hence, this new government will be marked by deadlock, and 
democratic reform will be either stalled or diluted (Howard and 
Roessler 2006; Schedler 2006; Carothers 2002). 
 Within the hybrid regime category, two different election 
outcomes are possible, but the end result is invariably a hybrid 
regime. In the first group, the opposition manages to win the first 
multiparty elections, despite being fragmented, but is unable to work 
together within the new government and to keep the old 
authoritarian elites at bay. Although the opposition may attempt to 
initiate pro-democratic reform, the old elites will be able to 
effectively block any major changes to the political system (Bunce 
1999). Furthermore, given the typically poor performance of the 
new government, the opposition is voted out of office in the 
subsequent elections, and replaced by the “reformed” old elites. 
This, in turn, stalls pro-democratic reform.  
 In the second group, the opposition loses the first multiparty 
elections, as a result of electoral manipulation and voter intimidation 
by the incumbent, but still manages to gain a minority of seats in the 
legislature. At the same time, the incumbent and his party perform 
equally poorly, and manage to hold on to office by a slim margin. 
As a result, the incumbent cannot prevent a significant 
parliamentary opposition from arising, and this opposition keeps the 
incumbent party in check, ensuring that at least some of the gains 
made during the initial transition period are preserved (van de Walle 
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2002). In these cases, it is clear that the incumbent cannot survive a 
reasonably free and fair election against a united opposition. 
 
Regime Trajectories in Sub-Saharan Africa 
How similar are African regimes today to the regimes they had prior 
to the watershed elections and during the transition period? To test 
my critical juncture theory, I begin by examining the SSA country 
Freedom House (FH) scores one year prior to the transition period, 
at the transition period, and at 2014, (25 years after the collapse of 
the Berlin Wall). I define the transition period as the year the first 
multiparty elections were held. In cases where the elections for the 
executive and the legislature are not simultaneous, I consider the 
transition period to be the earlier of the two.  
 For most countries in SSA, the transition period spans the 
years 1990-1998. By that time, four countries had not held elections: 
The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Eritrea, Rwanda, 
and Somalia. All four have been mired in either civil war or 
international conflict (Eritrea). For the DRC and Rwanda, I identify 
the transition year as the period when fighting has ceased and 
multiparty elections called, 2006 and 2003 respectively. Somalia 
and Eritrea have yet to hold national-level multiparty elections. For 
Eritrea, I take its year of independence from Ethiopia as its 
transition year. For Somalia, which has experienced no variation in 
regime type since before the collapse of the Soviet Union, I take 
1990 as the start of its regime trajectory. Furthermore, Botswana and 
Mauritius held free and fair multiparty elections in the years prior to 
the collapse of communism. For these countries, I take their 
transition period to be the next year post-1989 when elections were 
held, 1994 and 1991, respectively. As such, these years do not 
strictly constitute a transition period. However, the Gambia, which 
was rated Free prior to 1990, but then lapsed into authoritarianism in 
1994, is a good example of the potential for regime volatility post-
1989.  
 If the transition period is not relatively important, then the 
first multiparty elections should have little, to no impact, on the 
success or failure of democratization. Instead, historical and 
structural factors, which have developed over time, and predate the 
transition period, should drive the democratization process. If the 
transitology argument is correct, and actors, not structural factors, 
drive the transition process, then a country’s regime in 2014 should 
roughly resemble its regime type during and after the transition 
period. Furthermore, if the founding elections represent a significant 
break with the past, then a country’s regime type during the 
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transition period should look markedly different than the one it has 
immediately prior to the transition. 
 
Table 1 Regime Trajectories of Present-Day African Democracies  
 
Table 1 shows the regime trajectories of present-day African 
democracies. Only four countries were rated as Free by FH on year 
prior to the transition period (Botswana, the Gambia, Mauritius, and 
Namibia), and remained Free during the transition. Six countries 
improved their democratic rankings during the transition period by 
shifting from the Partially Free (hybrid) to the Free category, while 
one country (Malawi) transitioned from a Not Free (authoritarian) 
regime to democracy. Four of the transition democracies (Benin, 
Cape Verde, Sao Tome and Principe, and South Africa) remained 
 
Year before 
Transition 
     Transition 
          Period 
    2014 
 
Democracies 
Remained 
Democracy 
Remained 
Democracy 
Botswana Botswana Benin 
Gambia Gambia Botswana 
Mauritius Mauritius Cape Verde 
Namibia Namibia Mauritius 
   Namibia 
  
Transitioned from 
Hybrid to 
Democracy 
Sao Tome & 
Principe 
  Benin South Africa 
  Cape Verde   
  Mali 
Transitioned 
from Hybrid to 
Democracy 
  
Sao Tome & 
Principe Ghana 
  South Africa Lesotho 
  Zambia Senegal 
     
  
Transitioned from 
Authoritarian to 
Democracy 
Transitioned 
from 
Authoritarian to 
Democracy 
  Malawi N/A 
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Table 2 Regime Trajectories of Present-Day African Hybrid 
Regimes 
 
Year before 
Transition 
Transition 
 Period 2014 
Hybrid 
Regimes Remained Hybrid Remained Hybrid 
Angola 
Central African 
Republic Comoros 
Benin Congo (Brazzaville) Cote d'Ivoire 
Burundi Cote d'Ivoire Guinea-Bissau 
Cape Verde Guinea-Bissau Kenya 
CAR Lesotho Liberia 
Congo 
(Brazzaville) Madagascar Madagascar 
Cote d'Ivoire Niger Mozambique 
Guinea Nigeria Niger 
Guinea-Bissau Senegal Nigeria 
Lesotho Seychelles Seychelles 
Madagascar Uganda Sierra Leone 
Mali Zimbabwe Tanzania 
Niger    
Nigeria 
Transitioned from 
Democracy to 
Hybrid 
Transitioned from 
Democracy to 
Hybrid 
Sao Tome & 
Principe N/A Malawi 
Senegal  Mali 
Seychelles 
Transitioned from 
Authoritarian to 
Hybrid Zambia 
South Africa Comoros   
Swaziland Ethiopia 
Transitioned from 
Authoritarian to 
Hybrid 
Uganda Gabon Burkina Faso 
Zambia Ghana Guinea 
Zimbabwe Kenya Togo 
  Liberia   
  Mozambique   
  Sierra Leone   
  Tanzania   
14
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democracies in the long-term, along with the four original 
democracies. By 2014, several countries experienced democratic 
setbacks, reverting to a hybrid regime (Malawi, Mali, and Zambia), 
while one became authoritarian (the Gambia). Additionally, three 
countries managed democratization well after the transition period 
(Ghana, Lesotho, and Senegal). Of the eleven countries that were 
democracies during their transition period, seven retained their Free 
status.   
 Table 2 reports the regime trajectories for present-day hybrid 
regimes. Prior to the transition year, 22 African countries were 
ranked Partly Free. During the transition 12 kept their Partly Free 
status, and were joined by nine previously Not Free regimes. Of 
these 21 hybrid regimes, twelve remain hybrids today. The 
transition period had a long-term liberalizing effect in Comoros, 
Kenya, Liberia, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, and Tanzania. Three 
countries transitioned to hybrid regimes from authoritarian ones 
following the transition period: Burkina Faso, Guinea, and Togo. 
 
Finally, Table 3 displays the regime trajectories for present-day 
authoritarian regimes. The year prior to transition, 21 African 
countries were ranked Not Free, and twelve of them failed to 
liberalize during the transition period. They were joined by Angola, 
Burundi, Guinea, and Swaziland in the transition year. Of these 25 
transition autocracies, 13 remain Not Free currently. Furthermore, 
there were significant political setbacks in seven African states in 
the long term: the CAR, Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Gabon, 
the Gambia, Uganda, and Zimbabwe. 
 
 Overall, the FH scores reveal that the transition period did 
have significant and long-term liberalizing effects on 17 of 48 
African countries. Furthermore, the transition period does appear to 
guide the trajectories of the majority of African countries today. 
Sixty-seven percent of SSA countries have the same regimes today 
as they did in the transition period. To better understand the 
stability/volatility of these regime trajectories, I construct a measure 
titled “time in stasis.” The measure looks at the percentage of time, 
from the transition period to 2014, that a country maintains the same 
regime (Free, Partly Free, or Not Free) as it had in the transition 
period. Higher values indicate greater regime type stability. As one 
can see from Table 4, 18 countries have no variation in their regime 
trajectory, post-transition. Overall, 69% of countries spend a high 
proportion of time in stasis, while roughly 16% fluctuate at a 
15
Brigevich: Democratization or Business as Usual?
Published by Digital Scholarship @ Texas Southern University, 2019
African Social Science Review                Volume 10, Number 1, Spring 2019 
19 
 
medium level and 16% at a high level. It appears that most regimes 
do become locked into their regime type post-early 1990s. 
 
Table 3 Regime Trajectories of Present-Day African Autocracies 
 
 
Year before 
Transition Transition Period 2014 
Authoritarian 
Regimes 
Remained 
Authoritarian 
Remained 
Authoritarian 
Burkina Faso Burkina Faso Angola 
Cameroon Cameroon Burundi 
Chad Chad Cameroon 
Comoros DRC Chad 
DRC Djibouti Djibouti 
Djibouti Equatorial Guinea DRC 
Equatorial 
Guinea Eritrea  Equatorial Guinea 
Ethiopia Mauritania Eritrea  
Gabon Rwanda Mauritania 
Ghana Somalia Rwanda 
Kenya Sudan Somalia 
Liberia Togo Sudan 
Malawi  Swaziland 
Mauritania 
Transitioned: 
Hybrid to 
Authoritarian  
Mozambique Angola  
Transitioned: Hybrid 
to Authoritarian 
Rwanda Burundi CAR 
Sierra Leone Guinea Congo (Brazzaville) 
Somalia Swaziland Ethiopia 
Sudan  Gabon 
Tanzania 
Transitioned from 
Democracy to 
Authoritarian Uganda 
Togo N/A Zimbabwe 
     
   
Transitioned from 
Democracy to 
Authoritarian 
    The Gambia 
16
African Social Science Review, Vol. 10, No. 1 [2019], Art. 2
https://digitalscholarship.tsu.edu/assr/vol10/iss1/2
African Social Science Review                Volume 10, Number 1, Spring 2019 
20 
 
Table 4 Time “in Stasis” of African Regimes, Transition Period to Present 
High (100% - 75%) Medium (74% - 50%) Low (Below 49%) 
Angola - 100 Kenya - 61 Zimbabwe - 44 
Benin - 100 Senegal - 59 Cote d'Ivoire - 36 
Botswana - 100 Lesotho - 55 Ghana - 35 
Cameroon - 100 Djibouti - 52 Malawi - 24 
Cape Verde - 100 Burundi - 50 Gambia - 9 
Chad - 100 
Congo (Brazzaville) - 
50 
Zambia - 8 
Comoros - 100 Togo - 50 Burkina Faso - 4 
Equatorial Guinea - 
100 
  Madagascar - 100 
  Mauritius - 100 
  Mozambique - 100 
  Namibia - 100 
  Sao Tome & Principe 
- 100 
  Seychelles - 100 
  South Africa - 100 
  Sudan - 100 
  Swaziland - 100 
  Tanzania - 100 
  Uganda - 95 
  Guinea-Bissau – 90 
  Sierra Leone - 89 
  Niger - 86 
  CAR - 83 
  Liberia - 83 
  Mali - 83 
  Eritrea - 82 
  Mauritania - 78 
  Nigeria - 78 
  Guinea - 77 
  Gabon - 76 
  Ethiopia - 75 
  N= 31 N=7 N=7 
69% 15.50% 15.50% 
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Table 5 Regime Outcomes as Reflection of Opposition Cohesion and 
Civil Society Strength  
 
Finally, how well do opposition cohesion and civil society 
strength during the transition period predict long-term 
democratization in the SSA region? To measure opposition 
cohesion, I use the Bratton and van de Walle Opposition Cohesion 
measure, taken from the Political Regimes and Regime Transitions 
Opposition Wins Opposition Loses 
Cohesive Fragmented Cohesive Fragmented 
Democracy    
Cape Verde (0) Benin (2) Botswana (2) Senegal (0) 
Lesotho (1)   Ghana (0)   
Mauritius (1)       
Namibia (1)       
S.T. &  Principe (0)       
South Africa (2)       
    
Hybrid    
Niger (1) Madagascar (2) Burkina Faso (1) Comoros (0) 
Zambia (2) Malawi (2) Cote d'Ivoire (1) Guinea (0) 
  Mali (2) Mozambique (0) Guinea-Bissau (0) 
    Seychelles (0) Kenya (2) 
      Liberia (0) 
      Nigeria (1) 
      Sierra Leone (0) 
      Tanzania (1) 
      Togo (0) 
    
Autocracy    
Burundi (.) CAR (0) Angola (0) Cameroon (0) 
  Congo-Brazz. (1) Djibouti (0) Chad (0) 
      DRC (.) 
      Eq. Guinea (0) 
      Gabon (1) 
      Mauritania (0) 
      Sudan (0) 
      The Gambia (0) 
      Uganda (0) 
      Zimbabwe (1) 
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in Africa data set.4 The opposition cohesion measure is 
dichotomous, with countries receiving a score of 1 if the opposition 
was cohesive during the watershed elections and, 0 otherwise. I 
measure civil society strength using Freedom House’s How 
Freedom is Won report, which rates the strength of civic movements 
during the transition period on a three-point scale. In the report, 
Karatnycky and Ackerman (2005) define civil society as a 
grassroots conglomeration of civic forces that includes civic 
organizations, students, and trade unions, who may turn to mass 
protests, strikes, boycotts, blockades, and other forms of civic 
disobedience to affect political change. The report codes half the 
countries in SSA. I rely on the Bratton and van de Walle dataset to 
code the remaining countries. The dataset provides information on 
the number of trade unions and civic organizations active during the 
transition period, as well as the number of political protests in each 
SSA country. The Bratton and van de Walle data correlates nicely 
with that available from the Freedom House report. 
Table 5 identifies the strength of the opposition and civil 
society at the time of transition for present-day democracies, hybrid 
regimes, and authoritarian regimes. The pattern is most striking in 
the case of democracies versus authoritarian regimes. Present-day 
democracies had the largest proportion of cohesive opposition 
movements than either hybrids or autocracies. In most democracies, 
a cohesive opposition translated into an opposition victory. In only 
one case, Burundi, did a cohesive opposition win an election, but the 
regime remained authoritarian. This is reflective of the civic war that 
broke out shortly after the first multiparty elections. In Niger and 
Zambia, a cohesive opposition won the first elections, but the 
country remained a hybrid regime in the long-term. 
 If democratic regimes are marked by victorious and cohesive 
opposition movements, the reverse is true in autocracies. In two-
thirds of present-day authoritarian regimes, the opposition was 
fragmented and lost the first multiparty elections. That being said, 
the distribution of countries across the four columns is fairly similar 
across hybrids and autocracies. However, the difference in civic 
society scores helps explain why the former liberalized more than 
the latter. In 56% of the hybrid regimes, civic society was 
moderately strong (1) or strong (2). Compare that with only 20% of 
authoritarian regimes where civil society was moderately strong.   
                                               
4 Bratton and van de Walle’s “Political Regimes and Regime Transitions in Africa: A 
Comparative Handbook” is available online at the University of Michigan International 
Consortium for Political and Social Research. 
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 Table 5 identifies the strength of the opposition and civil 
society at the time of transition for present-day democracies, In 
short, the analysis presented here confirms the longstanding 
argument made by democratization scholars that opposition 
cohesion is crucial to successful democratization. However, it also 
points to the importance of a vibrant civil society in affecting 
positive regime change. When coupled together, the two groups 
produce a democratic regime. When a cohesive opposition is absent 
during the founding elections, a strong civil society still has the 
capability of creating momentum for democratic reform, and 
ensuring that the old elites do not revert back to authoritarianism. In 
the following section, I explore these arguments in greater detail by 
drawing on a two demonstrate the dynamic between elites, 
opposition groups, and civil society, and the roles that these groups 
play in the transition process. Furthermore, I show how the outcome 
of the founding elections condition the prospects of democratization 
further down the line. 
 
Regime Transitions and Path-Dependency 
As the above analysis suggests, there were two causal mechanisms 
that dictated the outcome of the first multiparty elections: opposition 
cohesion and civil society strength. Whether a country emerged 
from the transition phase as a full democracy, a hybrid regime, or an 
autocracy was largely predicated on the relative strength and 
capability of these two different sets of actors. Following the 
outcome of the first multiparty election, 68% of the countries found 
themselves “locked into” their regime type, indicating that building 
and maintaining democratic institutions is a path-dependent process.  
 Formal definitions of path-dependence are rare, and almost 
always subject to the scholar’s interpretation. However, more 
generally, path-dependence refers to the notion that specific patterns 
of timing and sequence matter, and that large consequences may 
result from ostensibly small events. Certain events have the potential 
to become “critical junctures,” setting the course for political 
development in a particular direction that becomes impossible to 
reverse as time goes on (Pierson and Skocpol 2002). In the context 
of regime transitions, path dependence implies that once a country 
has started down a particular track, or trajectory, the costs for 
reversing that trajectory are very high. As Margaret Levi points out, 
“There will be other choice points, but the entrenchments of certain 
institutional arrangements obstruct an easy reversal of the initial 
choice,” (Levi 1997: 28). Thus, earlier events matter more than later 
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ones, and different sequences of events may produce entirely 
different outcomes, or regime types.  
 In this analysis, the transition period is the “critical juncture,” 
and the ways in which the first multiparty elections played out 
dictate the long-term success or failure of democratization. Path-
dependence, as a social process, is grounded in the dynamic of 
“increasing returns” (Pierson 2000). Institutions or processes, once 
established, generate feedback mechanisms that reinforces these 
institutions, and make switching to a different course of action 
extremely difficult and costly (North 1990). In the context of the 
fourth wave transitions, the winners of the founding elections dictate 
the new rules of the game: they either create new institutions and 
procedures that reinforce the process of democratic reform, or they 
resurrect old authoritarian institutions and practices that prevent 
further reform from taking place (Easter 1997; Jones-Luong 2000). 
Although, typically, civil society’s role in creating new democratic 
institutions is less clearly defined, the cases in this sample show that 
civic action can have a profound effect on the initiation of the 
democratization process and on the long-term adherence to the new 
rules of the game. 
  
New Democracies 
In democracies, where a cohesive opposition won the founding 
elections, the new pro-democratic government set explicit limits on 
executive power, which constituted a definitive break with the 
authoritarian past. The new government was much more likely to 
enshrine the principle of checks on executive power in a new 
constitution that empowered the courts, and made the judiciary an 
independent actor in determining the legitimacy of executive 
decisions and upholding the rule of law, (see Magnusson 2001).  
 A cohesive and powerful opposition was much more 
successful in creating rifts within the old authoritarian elite and 
shifting the balance of power in favor of the new pro-democratic 
government. In such cases, during the period surrounding the 
founding elections, old elites sensed that the tide was turning against 
them, and that the opposition had gained significant support among 
the masses—significant enough to carry off a victory. Perceiving the 
probability of a loss in the founding elections, rank-and-file 
members of the old elite deserted their old party, distancing 
themselves from the party bureaucracy and realigning themselves 
more closely with the opposition. By doing so, these elites indicated 
that they accepted and supported the new rules of the game, thereby 
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solidifying the country’s commitment to political reform, and 
“locking” the country into a path of democratization.  
 An active civil society was important for successful 
democratic reform in three ways. First, in most cases, the initial 
opening up of the authoritarian system was done in response to mass 
political protests against the government, which indicated to the old 
regime that political reform could no longer be forestalled (Bratton 
and van de Walle 1992). These protests signaled the breakdown of 
authoritarian rule and created a widespread sense that there were 
alternatives to the old order. These mass demonstrations indicated to 
the old elite that the opposition camp would have popular support 
during election time, and prompted the old elites to abandon 
authoritarianism and defect to the opposition. This is precisely why 
a successful democratic transition also hinges on decisive civic 
action, rather than solely on opposition cohesion. 
 Second, a vibrant civil society severely limited the options 
available to the old elites during the transition period. If the 
opposition could mobilize widespread support among the 
population, this raised the cost of incumbent attempts to perpetuate 
electoral fraud, made it less likely that fraud would succeed, and 
perhaps deterred the incumbent from attempting it in the first place 
(Hale 2005: 141). Any attempts to do so carried the risk of mass 
uprisings, which would be costly to suppress and threaten the 
country’s stability. In SSA, where post-colonial rule was marred by 
political protests and subsequent military coups, many incumbents 
were cautious about perpetrating overt electoral fraud.  
 Finally, an active civil society was instrumental in 
conditioning both the opposition and the old elites to adhering to the 
new rules of the democratic game. Once elected to office on the 
promise of democratic reform, opposition parties were bound to 
their platforms. Because both the opposition and the old elites had 
accepted the standard of free and fair multiparty elections, 
opposition parties were aware that a failure to carry out their 
promises could potentially result in a loss of power in the 
subsequent elections. If old elites wanted to an opportunity to 
recoup their powerful positions, the only means of doing so was to 
rebrand themselves as democratizers and submit to the new rules of 
the game. If the old elites managed to win subsequent elections, they 
were conditioned to follow through with the democratic reform 
initiated by the opposition and civil society, or risk being ousted out 
of office in the following elections. Hence, we see that the extent of 
civic protest and active participation in the elections process is, in 
itself, part of the dynamic of increasing returns.  
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The victory of Nicéphore Soglo in the Beninese watershed elections 
provides an instructive example. Although Soglo rode into office on 
a wave of promises to reform the political system and resurrect the 
failing economy, his term proved highly disappointing. Shortly after 
taking office, Soglo’s wife was implicated in corrupt activities, 
crime increased drastically, and the economy plunged into crisis 
(Magnusson 2001). Civil society took to the streets and a military 
coup was barely averted. On August 2, 1994, in an attempt to 
consolidate power and remedy the failing economy, Soglo invoked 
emergency powers under the constitution to execute his own budget. 
The national assembly was outraged by what it perceived as an 
abuse of presidential power. Because Benin’s constitution requires 
the national assembly to fix a deadline limiting the validity of 
emergency powers, the assembly quickly voted for a deadline of 
August 5, and appealed the presidential action to the constitutional 
court (Magnusson 2001: 225). The court ruled in favor of the 
national assembly, asserting its new authority as the neutral final 
arbiter of executive-legislative disputes. This incident set an 
important precedent for future constraints on executive power, and 
demonstrated that the court was fully committed to upholding the 
rules outlined in the new constitution. 
As can be seen above, the political environment in Benin in 1994 
was highly volatile, and threatened long-term democratic stability in 
the country. However, despite the outbreak of protests against the 
Soglo government, civil society and the general populace chose to 
mediate its frustrations through formal institutional channels, such 
as political parties, government-union negotiations, and most 
importantly, elections (Magnusson 2001). In the 1996 presidential 
elections, Soglo’s principal opponent was none other than a newly-
reformed Kérékou, who won the elections with ease. The result was 
a peaceful transfer of power from one democratically elected leader 
to another, which demonstrates the commitment of both elites and 
civil society to consolidating democracy in Benin. Furthermore, 
although both Kérékou and Soglo contested the 2001 presidential 
elections, with Kérékou winning by a slim margin, both men 
peacefully accepted that they were barred from running in the 2006 
elections due to the age restrictions outlined in the constitution.  
 
Present-Day Autocracies 
In authoritarian regimes, the opposition was highly fragmented and 
weak at the time of the founding elections, and was inevitably 
crushed by the old regime. Whatever momentum for pro-democratic 
reform existed prior to the elections was subsequently stomped out 
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by the old elite. However, in many cases, electoral victory for the 
old regime was not over-determined at the outset of the transition 
period, and regime turnover was genuinely possible even in the 
more repressive regimes.5  
 During the first multiparty elections, it was difficult for both 
the authoritarian elite and the opposition to effectively gauge their 
potential appeal to the electorate, as well as the power of their 
opponents. Old elites may have been uncertain about the way that 
the elections would play out, but sensing the disorganized nature of 
the opposition, remained ostensibly loyal to the old regime. I say 
ostensibly because I take as given the assumption that political elites 
are motivated primarily by career security, and the desire to 
maintain or advance their positions (Hale 2005; Magaloni 2006). If 
the elites judge that it would be more personally and politically 
beneficial to defect, they are more likely to do so, and in greater 
numbers, despite their ideological preferences over a certain type of 
political system.  
 In authoritarian regimes, the old elites adopted a wait-and-see 
strategy, suspending any definitive actions until after the first 
elections, which would send clear signals about the strength of the 
incumbent and the opposition. When the incumbent won the 
elections, be it through political manipulation or through a 
legitimate electoral mandate, the elites chose to throw their lots in 
with the winner, and accept the continuation of the old authoritarian 
regime. In doing so, they participated in the reinforcement of old 
authoritarian institutions that concentrated all the power in the 
executive, and allowed the incumbent to suspend further reform. 
These countries quickly adopted presidential systems that placed all 
the power in the hands of the incumbent, while stripping the 
legislature of any true power (van de Walle 2003).  
 The outcome of the first multiparty elections gave the 
incumbent a carte blache to manipulate the political system, crafting 
policies that would prevent the opposition from posing an effective 
challenge to authoritarian rule. The new constitutions and electoral 
reforms in these countries prohibited any checks on the executive 
power and disempowered the national courts. Electoral commissions 
and Constitutional Courts were staffed with supporters of the old 
regime, (see Makumbe 2002). Voting eligibility requirements were 
                                               
5 For example, both Benin and Cameroon had similarly repressive regimes prior to the 
transition period, as well as highly unpopular incumbents contesting the founding 
elections. Yet, Benin managed a relatively fluid transition to democracy, while Cameroon 
remains under the oppressive leadership of Biya, despite holding regular elections. 
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changed to exclude any potential dissenters of the regime (Makumbe 
2002; Chirot 2006).  
 For example, following the founding elections in Cote 
d’Ivoire, President Henri Konan-Bédié and his camp created the 
concept of “Ivorité,” which excluded those that lived in the northern 
region of the country, the region where he received the least 
electoral support. Bédié passed new citizenship laws that required 
proof that one’s parents had been born in Côte d’Ivoire, but this was 
for the most part only required of northerners. As a result, many 
northerners were stripped of their citizenship and classified as 
“foreigners,” (Chirot 2006: 68). Furthermore, Bédié introduced a 
new electoral code stipulating that a presidential candidate had to be 
born of Ivorian parents, thereby effectively sideling his only serious 
rival, Alassane Outtara, a northerner (Bratton 1998: 58). 
 A passive civil society damaged the prospects for 
democratization. The lack of civic protest against the regime 
indicated to the old elites that the opposition would have a highly 
difficult time mobilizing an electorate to vote in its favor, and thus, 
kept the old elites in the incumbent’s camp. Lack of civic 
engagement allowed the incumbent to postpone the founding 
elections and marshal all of his resources to rig the elections. 
Bratton (1998: 56) points out that, “As the 1990s progressed, leaders 
became adept at accommodating the international norm of 
competitive elections, while at the same time learning to manipulate 
them to their own ends. In general, the later founding elections were 
held in Africa, the poorer the quality of their conduct and the lower 
the likelihood that incumbents would lose.” 
 The absence of strong civic organizations hurt the prospects 
for long-term democratization because it did not provide opposition 
parties with sources for mass mobilization around genuine issues of 
reform. Instead, as has been the case in most of SSA, opposition 
parties focus primarily on the politics of ethnic identity that appeal 
only to a small subset of the electorate (Randall and Svasand 2002: 
41). The result is a highly fragmented opposition that avoids the 
important issue of democratic reform, and aims at securing 
representation and political favors for their particular ethnic or 
regional group (van de Walle 2003). Finally, this fragmented nature 
of the opposition makes it much easier for the incumbent to co-opt 
parties in the legislature in exchange for minor concessions, thereby 
lessening the odds that a cohesive opposition will challenge the 
government on grounds of genuine democratic reform.   
 Take, for example, the 1992 watershed elections in 
Cameroon, which pitted incumbent President Paul Biya and his 
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Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement (CPDM) against 
opposition leader Ni John Fru Ndi and his Social Democratic Front 
(SDF). At the outset, Biya was reluctant to democratize and only 
conceded to opening up the political space as a means of appeasing 
his French benefactors. At the time of the elections, domestic 
discontent with Biya’s regime was widespread, leading many 
international observers to conclude that the introduction of 
multiparty politics would inevitably result in Biya’s demise 
(Takougang 2003, 473). Fru Ndi was a highly popular candidate, 
whose 1990 unauthorized move to form the SDF, in spite of a ban 
on multiparty politics, earned him tremendous national appeal. 
 However, between 1991 and 1992, the SDF made a series of 
mistakes that severely undermined any leverage it had against the 
highly unpopular regime and fragmented the coalition of many 
opposition parties and civic groups, the National Coordination of 
Opposition Parties and Associations (NCOPA). For one, the SDF 
failed to successfully carry off the Ghost Town protests, a series of 
boycotts and demonstrations against the Biya regime, thereby 
creating a rift between different factions of the NCOPA, with some 
groups arguing that the project had run its course and should be 
abandoned. Two, they withdrew their representatives from the 
Tripartite Conference, organized by Biya with the intent of 
forestalling genuine reform, while two other major opposition 
parties signed the final Conference Accords. Most importantly, still 
angry over the dictatorial manner with which the Biya regime 
conducted the conference, the SDF refused to participate in the 1992 
legislative elections. According to most political observers, Biya and 
the CPDM were so politically weak in 1992 that the SDF would 
certainly have won the majority of the seats in the legislature and 
would have the opportunity to directly influence the political 
process. 
The fragmented state of the opposition was also evident in the 
1992 presidential elections, in which the SDF did participate. Going 
into the election, Fru Ndi was by far the most popular candidate, and 
could have easily won the elections had Bello Bouba Maigari, a 
third-party candidate, thrown his support behind Fru Ndi rather than 
running his own campaign and splitting the opposition vote. In the 
end, Biya received 40% of the national vote, as compared to Fru 
Ndi’s 36% and Bouba Maigari’s 19.2 % (Olukoshi 2001: 273). Had 
the opposition banned together, Biya could have been easily 
deposed. Bouba Maigari then dealt another blow to the opposition 
by endorsing the outcome of the elections, while the SDF and other 
opposition parties were protesting the results.  
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Bouba Maigari’s actions are telling of the way that the Cameroonian 
opposition parties have chosen to deal, and bargain, with Biya’s 
regime. Following Biya’s presidential victory, two high-ranking 
members of Bouba Maigari’s party, the National Union for 
Democracy and Progress (UNDP), accepted cabinet posts in the 
Biya government. Because both men accepted the positions without 
the approval of the party’s leadership, they were dismissed from the 
party. However, five years later, Bouba Maigari, himself, accepted a 
cabinet post in the Biya regime without party approval (Takougang 
2003: 440). Even more discouraging for the state of Cameroonian 
opposition politics is that even the SDF, which has been fighting the 
Biya regime for over a decade, may be willing to be co-opted by the 
regime. In 2002, following the legislative elections in which the 
CPDM won a majority of seats, reports circulated that the SDF was 
willing to join the administration if it was offered six cabinet 
positions, including the post of prime minister (Takougang 2003: 
440).  
 The inability of the SDF to wrestle power away from the Biya 
regime in the early phases of the transition period had a devastating 
effect on the pace and extent of political reform in Cameroon. 
However, the other major opposition parties are to blame as well. 
They have routinely allowed themselves to be manipulated and co-
opted by the Biya regime, and are willing to sacrifice democratic 
reform in exchange for personal wealth and a greater access of 
power to the political system. For its part, civil society played a very 
limited role in the transition process. Although the masses were 
willing to participate in boycotts and demonstrations, they did so 
with little planning and for only a short period of time. The 
continuation of the Biya regime well into 2018 has left many people 
apathetic to democratic reform and has fostered a general distrust in 
the political process. As a result, voter turn out is very low, and civil 
society has retreated into the private space (Nkwi 2006). 
  
Hybrid Regimes 
In hybrid regimes, where neither the old authoritarian elite nor the 
opposition manage to win a clear electoral mandate and are forced to 
govern in cooperation with the opposing side, the extent of 
democratization will necessarily be stalled until the opposition 
emerges victorious (Bunce 1999; McFaul 2002). The likelihood of 
opposition victory hinges on its ability to form a cohesive coalition 
among various opposition parties and their supporters. This is no 
easy task during the initial transition period, when numerous 
opposition parties attempt to carve out their niche in the incipient 
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party system. These parties are tempted to secure the spoils of 
victory for themselves, and may be reluctant to consider sharing 
these spoils with others. It becomes even more difficult to form 
cohesive coalitions with subsequent elections, and to convince the 
electorate that an opposition-led government is a viable alternative 
to the government of the day. This dynamic, explored below, creates 
feedback mechanisms that lock the country into a hybrid regime 
trajectory and prevents the consolidation of democracy.  
 In hybrid regimes, the rules of the game, as well as elite 
policy preferences, are ill defined, as the opposing sides attempt to 
accomplish their contradictory agendas within the same political 
space. While the opposition pushes for further democratic reform, 
the old elites strive to preserve the status quo and hold on to the 
power resources left over from the old regime (Easter 1997). This 
situation is complicated by the fact that both the opposition and the 
old elites are weak and have to share institutional power (Bunce 
1999). Typically, the incumbent, or his party, managed to win the 
presidency in the founding elections, but failed to prevent the 
opposition from gaining a significant portion of seats in the 
legislature. Thus, while the incumbent tried to rewrite the rules of 
the game to consolidate his power, the opposition was strong 
enough to block at least some of the anti-democratic reforms. The 
result is authoritarian rule coupled with some democratic reform that 
defines hybrid regimes (van de Walle 2002). 
 For opposition parties, gaining unequivocal control of both 
the executive and the legislature is key to crafting successful pro-
democratic reform. However, there are a number of reasons that 
opposition parties in hybrid regimes have consistently failed to win 
a clear victory in the polls following the founding elections. Clearly, 
old elites still command many of the power resources left over from 
the old regime, which allows them to manipulate the electoral 
process (Howard and Roessler 2006). Yet, more importantly, 
opposition parties themselves have failed to pursue an effective 
strategy that would give them an advantage vis-à-vis the incumbent 
during election time or facilitate democratic reform. 
For example, in Kenya, President Daniel arap Moi barely survived 
the watershed presidential elections, winning only 36% of the 
popular vote. Although these elections were not deemed free and 
fair by the international community, part of the reason for Moi’s 
victory was the highly fragmented nature of the opposition. In the 
parliamentary elections held that same year, Moi’s party, Kenya 
African National Union (KANU), which had held power for forty 
years, received an equally dismal proportion of the vote, 24.5%. The 
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next largest share of votes went to the opposition party Forum for 
the Restoration of Democracy (FORD)-Asili, who received 20.6%. 
Moi went on to win the next presidential elections in 1997.  
In 2002, Moi’s was constitutionally barred from running for 
president, although some of his supporters proposed amending the 
constitution to allow him to run for a third presidential term. 
However, facing significant international and domestic pressure, 
Moi chose to step down peacefully, and appoint a successor, instead. 
Moi’s successor, Uhuru Kenyatta, lost the presidential elections to 
Mwai Kibaki, who had run against Moi in the past two elections. 
Kibaki’s opposition party National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) 
similarly won by a landslide in the 2002 parliamentary elections, 
proving that opposition victory is possible if the opposition parties 
ban together (Ndegwa 2003). The removal of Moi and KANU from 
office clearly shows that political liberalization is possible in hybrid 
regimes, given the incumbent adheres to the democratic rules of the 
game.    
 One of chief problems with the strategy of the opposition is 
that party platforms are typically designed solely to attract enough 
voters in the hopes of winning the election, but lacking in substance 
or a clear direction for future political reform (Randall and Svasand 
2002; van de Walle 2002). As Randall and Svasand (2002: 33) write 
about the state of African party politics, “…it seems to be that 
parties care little about presenting clearly distinguishable policy 
platforms, and that, if, exceptionally, they do, the platform has little 
relevance to what the party does once in office.” Although the idea 
of pro-democratic reform may be popular among the masses, 
citizens are rarely mobilized along these lines. Instead, they are 
forced to choose among candidates representing regional or ethnic 
differences, or running on their personal popularity among a small 
group of voters. Even when opposition candidates are elected to 
office, no coherent pro-democratic reform strategy emerges and no 
new institutions are created to “lock-in” that strategy. 
 Because the party system is not yet fully crystallized, and 
coherent party agendas not yet defined, new parties spring up 
regularly around election time, and further add to the fragmentation 
of the embryonic party system (Randall and Svasand 2002; van de 
Walle 2002). Seeing that significant room still exists for newer 
parties to put forth their agendas and carve out their own niche in the 
party system, many (local/regional) elites are tempted to create their 
own parties in order to contest elections and reap the benefits of 
political power, rather than joining up with the already established 
opposition parties. As is the case with authoritarian regimes, even 
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when these small opposition parties do manage to win seats in 
parliament, they are particularly prone to cooptation by the old 
elites. Thus, in hybrid regimes, the ill-defined rules of party 
competition that emerge following the initial transition period allow 
for small parties to enter the political arena and fragment the party 
system, thereby reinforcing sporadic and fleeting democratic reform. 
 If opposition parties are unwilling or incapable of working 
together to further the democratic agenda, where does the impetus 
for political reform originate? If the opposition remains fragmented 
following the first multiparty elections, what prevents the old elites 
from capturing the political system and overhauling any of the 
democratic gains of the initial transition? The analysis here suggests 
that the key causal mechanism is the presence of an active civil 
society.  
 In the beginning of the transition period, hybrid regime civic 
groups played a more marginal role in demanding democratic 
reform and opening up the political space than in present-day 
democracies. However, by voting in at least some opposition parties 
in the founding elections, civil society did indicate to the old elites 
that democratic reform had to be put on the political agenda. 
Furthermore, as in the case of present-day democracies, the threat of 
public backlash against overt electoral manipulation made it more 
likely that the old elites would avoid such behavior. Hence, in 
hybrid regimes, civil society serves the same functions as in 
democratic regimes, as it waits for opposition parties to better define 
their platforms, form cohesive coalitions, and present a viable 
alternative to the ruling government of the day.  
 The growth of civic activism over the past decade and a half 
has led to further liberalization of the political space in many hybrid 
regimes. While civil society may have been relatively passive in the 
beginning phases of the democratic transition, due to the high level 
of uncertainty surrounding the incumbent’s willingness to use force 
and repression to punish regime dissenters, the recent years have 
seen a dramatic increase in civic protest against anti-democratic 
government policies. These events show the capacity of an active 
civil society to affect the course of the transition and improve the 
quality of the democratization process. 
 
Conclusion  
The fourth wave of democratization gave rise to a variety of regimes 
across the globe. As some countries managed a successful transition 
to democracy, others stalled mid-process or reverted back to 
authoritarianism. In places like the DRC, Somalia, and Swaziland, 
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regime change has yet to occur. This analysis reveals that the 
transition period, and the events surrounding it, are a significant 
determinant of a country’s trajectory towards or away from 
successful democratization. In particular, the success of the 
democratic transition depends largely on the level of cohesion 
among the various opposition parties contesting elections. Only by 
presenting a united front during election time does the opposition 
movement stand a chance of ousting the authoritarian incumbent. 
Furthermore, for democratization to become institutionalized, the 
incumbent must be ousted, even if only temporarily. This analysis 
also indicates that civic protest does drive the democratization 
process. A vibrant civil society is equally important for building and 
consolidating democracy, and political protest and participation in 
civic groups does create impetus for regime change. 
 These findings have significant policy implications. Foreign 
aid directed at democracy building should target opposition groups. 
Western donors must encourage diverse opposition parties to work 
together and construct political platforms that appeal to the whole 
national electorate, rather than regional segments of the population. 
Furthermore, if possible, donors must assist the opposition in the 
dissemination of factual information that highlights the benefits of 
democracy. Only in this way can the opposition hope to overcome 
the information asymmetry problem that benefits authoritarian 
regimes. Foreign aid should also support the development of a 
healthy civil society. The greatest challenge facing the revitalization 
of civic groups is lack of financial resources and organizational 
know-how. In authoritarian and hybrid regimes, most of the state’s 
resources remain in the hands of the old elite, who will not finance 
organizations that are potential sites of dissent. In the meantime, 
many of these countries have poor economies, and their citizens 
struggle from day to day to make a living. Thus, without foreign aid, 
it is questionable whether civil society will ever become vibrant on 
its own. 
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